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WHAT’S MONEY GOT TO DO WITH
IT: ROBERS V. UNITED STATES AND
COLLATERAL UNDER THE
MANDATORY VICTIMS
RESTITUTION ACT OF 1996
*

TORI M. BENNETTE
I. INTRODUCTION

Each year banks and other lenders make numerous loans to
borrowers based on ostensibly accurate information only to learn that
1
much of the information is fraudulent. In fact, the breadth and depth
2
of mortgage loan origination fraud has been immense. Between 2006
and 2010, borrowers obtained more than $80 billion in mortgage loans
3
by using fraudulent application data. Lenders who are fraudulently
induced into making loans can seek relief under the Mandatory
4
Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA). The MVRA governs
federal criminal restitution and provides that in cases of crimes
5
resulting in the loss of a victim’s property, restitution is mandatory.
6
In Robers v. United States, the Supreme Court will consider
whether a defendant who has fraudulently obtained a loan, and thus
owes restitution to the lender under the MVRA, returns any part of
7
the loan money by giving the lenders the collateral securing the loan.
Petitioner Benjamin Robers asks the Court to hold that the return of

*

J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Elisabeth D. de Fontenay, Ravi Patel, Todd Noelle, and Brianna Strange for their assistance in
connection with this note.
1. See, e.g., FIN. CRIMES INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2010
MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications/mortgage-fraud-2010/mortgage-fraud-report-2010.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (West 2014).
5. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663A(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 2014).
6. Robers v. United States, No. 12-9012 (U.S. argued Feb. 25, 2014).
7. Brief for Petitioner at i, Robers v. United States, No. 12-9012 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2013).
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houses that served as collateral for loans made to him constitutes a
8
return of at least part of the loan money to those lenders. Both sides
agree that under the MVRA, courts must reduce the restitution
9
award by “the value . . . of any part of the property that is returned.”
But they disagree regarding the question of what constitutes “the
10
property that is returned.”
Robers argues that “the property returned” is the value of the
houses at the time of foreclosure because that is the time the
11
properties are surrendered or returned to the lenders —the collateral
as returned property rule. On the other hand, the government argues
that only the eventual cash proceeds obtained when the properties
are resold count because cash—not collateral—is the property that
12
was fraudulently obtained, and cash is what needs to be returned —
the cash as returned property rule. Answering this question, the
Seventh Circuit, siding with the government, held that the value of the
property returned (that is, the defendant’s restitution obligation
“offset value”) is the eventual cash proceeds from the resale of the
13
property—the cash as returned property rule.
In Robers, the Supreme Court will ultimately decide what
constitutes “the property that is returned” for purposes of calculating
the defendant’s restitution offset value. Based on the MVRA’s plain
14
meaning and its strong purpose to make the victim whole, the Court
will likely conclude that “the property that is returned” for offset
value purposes is the property originally fraudulently obtained, which
in this case was cash—not the houses which served as collateral for
the cash. The property fraudulently obtained is only returned upon
the recoupment of cash proceeds obtained when the collateral houses
are resold.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2004, Benjamin Robers participated in a mortgage-fraud
15
scheme devised and carried out by several co-conspirators. The co8. Id. at 2.
9. United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3663A(b)(1) (2006)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470 (Oct. 21, 2013).
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 943.
15. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7 at 7.
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conspirators collected “consulting fees” from prospective home sellers
under the guise that they could maximize the value of the sellers’
16
homes. As part of the scheme, the co-conspirators arranged for
“straw buyers” to purchase the homes by obtaining loans from
17
lenders based on false loan applications. The co-conspirators
recruited Robers as a straw buyer for two homes in Walworth County,
18
Robers materially misrepresented his “income,
Wisconsin.
qualifications, and intent to live in the houses and repay the
19
mortgages.” Based on these fraudulent loan applications, Robers
secured loans and wired the money to settlement companies who
20
closed the loans. Robers received $500.00 for each loan for his role
21
in the scheme.
When Robers defaulted on both loans, the lenders (or their
successors-in-interest) foreclosed on the houses, taking title to them at
22
sheriff’s foreclosure sales in 2006. Ultimately, these lenders resold
the properties in 2007 and 2008 for substantially less than the loan
23
amounts.
In May 2010, the government charged Robers with conspiracy to
24
25
commit wire fraud. Robers ultimately pleaded guilty. Based on
information presented by the government at the sentencing hearing,
the district court ordered Robers to pay approximately $219,000.00 in
26
restitution. This restitution calculation consisted of the loan amounts,
plus additional expenses incurred to maintain the collateral
properties—approximately $491,000.00—less the net cash proceeds
obtained from resale of the properties—approximately $272,000.00—
27
for a total restitution award of approximately $219,000.00.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 8–9.
19. United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470
(Oct. 21, 2013).
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 7, at 9–10.
23. See id.at 10.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470
(Oct. 21, 2013).
26. See id. at 941. Robers's co-conspirators “were also ordered to pay restitution in the
same amounts and the restitution awards were all entered with joint and several liability.” Id.
27. Id. at 940–41. Specifically, the court's restitution calculation consisted of the following:
Robers’s original mortgage note on one property was $330,000.00, and the property sold for
$164,000.00, resulting in a loss of $166,000.00. The successor lender for the other property
bought the mortgage note for $159,214.91, incurred additional expenses maintaining the
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Language and Purpose of the MVRA
The MVRA requires defendants convicted of certain fraud crimes
(such as the one committed by Robers) to make full restitution to
28
their victims. In the event of a crime that deprives a victim of
property, the statute further requires the defendant to return the
property to the victim, unless the return is “impossible, impracticable,
29
or inadequate.” When the return is not possible, the defendant must
pay to the victim an amount equal to the value of the property but is
given credit for “the value (as of the date the property is returned) of
30
any part of the property that is returned.”
The statute’s “primary and overarching” purpose is “to
31
compensate victims for their losses” and make them whole again. To
this end, the MVRA provides in relevant part that a court shall order
repayment to each victim restitution in the full amount of the victim’s
losses as determined by the court without consideration of the
32
financial circumstances of the defendant. Additionally, the court
cannot take into account any compensation received by the victim
33
from any source in determining the restitution amount.
34
But the MVRA is not meant to provide windfalls. While the
MVRA requires that courts calculate restitution awards to include

property in the amount of $1,646.20, and recovered net proceeds after the resale of the property
in the amount of $107,908.93, resulting in an overall loss of $52,952.18. Hence, the court ordered
Robers to pay a total restitution amount of $218,952.18, consisting of the $166,000.00 and
$52,952.18 losses. Id.
28. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii); § 3664(f)(1)(A) (West 2014).
29. § 3663A(b)(1)(B).
30. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations
omitted), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470 (Oct. 21, 2013); see also Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S.
605, 612 (2010) (stating that the MVRA’s purpose is “to assure that victims of a crime receive
full restitution”); United States v. Simmonds, 235 F.3d 826, 831 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing the
MVRA as having “the primary and overarching goal . . . to make victims of crime whole, to fully
compensate these victims for their losses and to restore these victims to their original state of
well-being”).
32. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
33. See § 3664(f)(1)(B).
34. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7 at 38; Robers, 698 F.3d at 944 (explaining that “[t]he
MVRA ensure[s] that victims recover the full amount of their losses, but nothing more”)
(quoting United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v.
Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1057 (10th Cir. 1998) (“A district court may not order restitution in an
amount that exceeds the loss caused by the defendant's conduct. Such a restitution order would
amount to an illegal sentence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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35

the full amount of the victims’ losses, the statute also requires the
courts to reduce the restitution awards by the value of any property
36
(or any part of the property) the defendant returns. Consequently,
under the MVRA, while courts must fully compensate victims for
37
their losses, they cannot over-compensate them.
B. Circuit Split on What Constitutes the Property Returned under §
3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the MVRA for Purposes of Reducing the
Restitution Award
The federal circuit courts are split on what constitutes “the
property returned” under § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the MVRA for
purposes of calculating the offset value or reduction in the restitution
38
award. The Ninth, Fifth, and Second Circuits have held that the
offset value of the property returned is based on the estimated fair
39
market value of the collateral on the date of foreclosure —treating
the collateral as the returned property. However, the Third, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits have concluded that the offset value of the
property returned is based on the cash proceeds recouped upon resale
40
of the collateral —treating the cash as the returned property.
41
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Smith exemplifies
the use of the “collateral as returned property” rule. In Smith, the
42
victim lent money to the defendant based on the defendant’s fraud.
When the defendant defaulted, the lender foreclosed on the collateral
43
real estate. The defendant asserted that the district court erred in not
giving him credit for the value of the property at the time the victim
44
lender took possession of it at the foreclosure sale.
45
The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that a restitution order must
reduce the victim’s loss by the “value (as of the date the property is
46
returned) of any part of the property that is returned.” The court

35. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (West 2014); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A).
36. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii).
37. See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 946 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct.
470 (Oct. 21, 2013).
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 951.
41. 944 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1991).
42. Id. at 620.
43. Smith, 944 F.2d at 620–21.
44. Id. at 625.
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(1)(B) (1988)).
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48

based its decision on its previous holding in United States v. Tyler. In
Tyler, the defendant pleaded guilty to theft of timber and was ordered
49
to pay restitution. Because the timber was recovered on the same
day as the theft, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[a]ny reduction in
[the timber’s] value stems from the government’s decision to hold the
timber during a period of declining prices, not from Tyler’s criminal
50
acts.” Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the value of the property
“as of the date the property was returned” equaled the amount lost
51
when the timber was stolen. And, consequently, the measure of
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(1)(B), the predecessor to §
52
3663(b)(1)(B) of the MVRA, was zero, and no restitution was owed.
But Tyler is distinguishable from Smith because in Tyler the
property returned was the same as the property stolen, i.e., the timber,
whereas in Smith, the property fraudulently obtained was cash and
the property returned was real estate. Despite this key distinction,
however, the Ninth, Fifth, and Second Circuits, applying Smith, have
53
all endorsed the collateral as returned property rule.
On the other hand, the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all
held that the restitution obligation offset value should be based on
54
the cash as returned property rule. For example, in United States v.
55
James the defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud for involvement in
a scheme to purchase homes by obtaining fraudulent mortgage
56
loans. When the defendant failed to pay the loans, the property
securing the loans was foreclosed upon, and the mortgage holders

47. See id. at 625.
48. 767 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985).
49. Id. at 1351.
50. Id. at 1352.
51. Id. at 1352–53.
52. See id.
53. See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 949–50 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 470 (Oct. 21, 2013).
54. See United States v. Himler, 355 F.3d 735, 745 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in entering a restitution order that would be reduced by the
future proceeds from the real estate’s sale); United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 1246–47
(10th Cir. 2009) (upholding the district court’s restitution order that calculated the total loss by
subtracting the eventual resale price of the collateral real estate from the initial loan proceeds);
United States v. Statman, 604 F.3d 529, 538 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding the district court’s use of
the eventual proceeds from a foreclosure sale as the offset value); Robers, 698 F.3d at 951–53
(discussing the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit property restitution cases and explaining that
they all concluded the offset value is determined based on the eventual cash proceeds recouped
following resale of the property).
55. 564 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2009).
56. Id. at 1239–40.
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57

suffered a financial loss. The district court reduced the defendant’s
restitution judgment, but only by the eventual resale price of the
58
collateral real estate.
In upholding the award, the Tenth Circuit noted that, under the
59
MVRA, how to value the property returned is not specified. Rather,
sentencing courts can utilize discretion in valuing the property as
60
appropriate in a given case. The court noted that the MVRA
demonstrates this by providing, in relevant part, a “court shall order
restitution . . . in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined
61
by the court.” Importantly, the court further pointed out that the
approach used to best measure the value of the property returned
should reflect the purpose of restitution, which is to “ensure that
victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their
62
losses.” Relying on the purpose of restitution, the court held that the
cash as returned property is the appropriate manner for determining
63
the mortgage holder’s actual loss.
64
Similarly, in United States v. Statman, the Eighth Circuit upheld
65
the cash as returned property rule. The court emphasized that “[t]he
intended beneficiaries of the MVRA[] . . . are the victims, not the
66
victimizers.” Therefore, the court held that net proceeds recouped
after resale of the property “provided a fair and adequate
representation of the [mortgage holder’s] loss and satisfied the
67
overarching goal of the MVRA, to make [the victim] whole.” The
key distinguishing factor in the split is whether the circuit courts
chose to rely on the sentencing courts’ discretion in determining that
the best method for calculating the offset value, taking into account
the legislative purpose behind the MVRA, is the cash as returned
property rule.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 1242.
59. Id. at 1245.
60. Id. at 1245 (citations omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1246 (quoting United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1323 (10th Cir. 2009)).
63. Id. at 1246.
64. 604 F.3d 529 (8th Cir. 2010).
65. Id. at 537–38.
66. Id. at 538 (quoting United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation omitted)).
67. Id.
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IV. HOLDING
On appeal, Robers argued that the offset value for the restitution
68
award should not be based on the cash as returned property rule.
Rather, the statute’s plain language allows the court to reduce
restitution by the value of the collateral real estate as of the
foreclosure date; the foreclosure date value is the value “as of the
date the property is returned,” which complies with the statutory
69
language. Robers further argued that by not using the property
values on the actual foreclosure dates, the court wrongly held him
responsible for the decline in the properties’ values from the time of
70
foreclosure to the time of resale; the restitution award was too high.
Contrastingly, the government finds the plain language of the
MVRA supports a restitution award that can only be reduced by the
cash value of the collateral received at resale because cash—in the
form of loan money— is the property that was taken, and cash is only
71
returned at resale. Robers’s appeal to the Seventh Circuit challenged
72
only the calculation of the restitution award.
The Seventh Circuit in Robers followed the Third, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits holding “the offset value is the eventual cash proceeds
73
recouped [when the property is resold] following a foreclosure sale.”
The Seventh Circuit based its decision on the plain meaning of the
74
MVRA. The MVRA states that the defendant should be given an
offset for “the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any
75
part of the property that is returned.” Thus, the court reasoned that
“the property,” for purposes of determining offset value, must mean
76
“the property stolen,” and the property originally stolen was cash.
Therefore “[s]ome amount of cash is the only way part of the property

68. United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 470
(Oct. 21, 2013).
69. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) (2006)).
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 941. Although at the district court level Robers argued that his minor role in the
offense and his limited economic circumstances should reduce the restitution amount, he did not
make those arguments on appeal. Id. at 941 n.3. As part of his challenge on appeal to the
restitution amount, however, he did contend that the inclusion of certain consequential or
incidental expenses are not recoverable under the MVRA. Id. at 941.
73. Id. at 939.
74. Id.
75. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2014).
76. Robers, 698 F.3d at 939.
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can be returned.”
The court explained that cash and real estate are not the same;
78
cash is liquid and real estate is not. “The victim-lender was
defrauded out of cash and wants cash back; the victim does not want
the houses and they do not, in any way, benefit from possessing title to
79
the houses until they are converted into cash upon resale” —one
cannot be given for the other.
The court concluded that its holding is consistent with both the
goals of the MVRA and the general concept of restitution: “to fully
compensate these victims for their losses and to restore these victims
80
to their original state of well-being.” If the offset amount was not
based on the eventual cash proceeds, the victims might not be made
81
whole. The eventual sales proceeds could be, as in this case,
“woefully inadequate to fully compensate the victims for their loss
and to put them in the position they would have been absent the
82
fraud.”
Though acknowledging that its conclusion conflicts with the Ninth,
Fifth, and Second Circuits, the court noted that no pertinent case from
those circuits independently addressed the specific question of what
83
constitutes “the property” under § 3663A(b)(1). The prior court
decisions had all relied on Smith, which in turn improperly relied on
Tyler; Tyler addressed the theft of government owned timber—there
was no question of “what” the property returned was. The Smith case
did not address the same type of property at issue in Tyler, and
therefore reliance was improper. The Seventh Circuit determined that
the Ninth, Fifth, and Second Circuit decisions were based on an
84
improper treatment of the statute.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 942.
Id.
Id. at 943 (quoting United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 946.
Id.
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V. ARGUMENTS
A. Robers’s Arguments
Robers first argues that the plain text and structure of the MVRA
require that he receives an offset for the collateral real estate’s value
85
when the lender takes title. Further, Robers contends that use of the
word “returned” in the offset provision permits a defendant to give
86
substitute property. If Congress had not intended such, it “could
have used a more specific phrase such as the property reclaimed by
87
the victim, but did not.” Robers asserts that “[t]he word ‘return’ has
a broad reach. . . . ‘[R]eturn’ means ‘to repay or pay back in some
88
similar way, esp[ecially] with something similar.’”
According to Robers, under the structure of § 3663A(b)(1), a
defendant is required to return the property originally taken from the
89
victim. However, § 3663A(b)(1)(B), containing the offset provision,
applies when the return of the property originally lost is “impossible,
90
impracticable, or inadequate;” therefore, Congress intended for this
provision to cover cases in which substitute property has been
91
returned. “If ‘property’ in that provision referred only to the
property originally lost . . . then the offset provision would apply only
in rare cases”; Congress did not intend for this provision to be so
92
narrowly applied.
Section 3664, the procedural provision covering the issuance and
enforcement of restitution orders under the MVRA, also supports a
broader reading of § 3663A(b)(1)(B). Section 3664 permits
“replacement property” to be an acceptable “in-kind” return of
93
property. Specifically, Robers states that “[s]ection 3664(f)(3)(A)
provides that a restitution order may require ‘a single, lump-sum
payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or
94
a combination of’ types of payments.” Additionally, § 3664(f)(4)
permits an in-kind payment to be in the form of either the “return of

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 7, at 14.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
See id. at 22.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2006)).
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26 (quoting § 3664(f)(3)(A) (2006)).
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property” or “replacement of property” or, if the victim consents, the
95
performance of services. This demonstrates Congress’s intent to give
defendants latitude in the type or form of property returned to the
96
victim by not requiring them to return the exact property.
Moreover, Robers argues that the allowance of replacement property
under § 3664 indicates Congress’s intent to provide judges flexibility
97
in tailoring restitution orders. Permitting replacement property
under the offset provision in § 3663A(b)(1)(B) furthers this goal.
A narrow reading of the offset provision should be avoided
because reading the provision more broadly to include replacement
property eliminates the possibility of the defendant paying for losses
98
he did not proximately cause. The MVRA, as well as fundamental
principles of criminal and tort law, provide that a defendant is
responsible only for losses “directly and proximately caused by the
99
course of [his] conduct.” A narrow reading of the offset provision
would allow for a reduction in the restitution award only by the
houses’ values at resale rather than at foreclosure, meaning “the
defendant must pay for any decline in the houses’ values between the
100
time the lenders foreclose and the time the lenders resell.” Yet, as
Robers contends, “a defendant’s false loan application is rarely the
101
‘direct,’ ‘unbroken’ cause of those losses.” Instead, such decline in
102
values result from “[o]ther ‘independent,’ ‘intervening’ causes.” If
the houses drop in value, it is due to a market decline that is largely
103
“unforeseeable” and thus a “‘superseding’ cause of the losses.”
Alternatively, Robers claims that the lenders themselves are
responsible for the losses in market values of the houses since the
lenders controlled how promptly to sell the houses after the
104
foreclosure sales. Thus, even if Robers’s fraud was a cause of the
105
losses, it was certainly not the proximate cause.
Additionally, Robers argues that the Seventh Circuit’s narrow
reading of the offset provision negates well-established tenets of state
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30.
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106

mortgage and foreclosure laws. The mortgage and foreclosure “law
dictates that when a lender forecloses and takes title to the property,
foreclosure law values the property as of the date the lender takes
107
title, not as of the date the property is sold.” When the lender waives
its right to a deficiency judgment, as Robers’s lenders did, the lenders
have accepted “the real estate collateral as a replacement for the loan
108
proceeds.” “Taking title to the property is thus a common means of
109
getting a ‘return’ of the loan proceeds.” Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s
ruling that the offset value must be the cash recouped from the
property’s resale, and that cash is what the lender actually wants,
110
“turns the concept of collateral on its head.” Robers urges that, “[a]s
this case demonstrates, lenders often want nothing but the
collateral—and contractually bind themselves to seek only the
111
collateral.” Therefore, the Court should not presume Congress
intended “to establish a regime at complete odds with the common
and state law practices of awarding compensatory damages in such
112
situations.”
Rober’s argues that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling undermines the
113
statutory purpose of the MVRA.
Specifically, because “[t]he
MVRA’s purpose is to make victims whole without granting them
114
windfalls,” the Seventh Circuit’s ruling creates the dual risk of both
115
Robers
under-compensating and over-compensating victims.
explains that in some cases victims would not have resold the
116
collateral houses before the sentencing of the defendant. In those
instances, the court has two choices: (1) refuse to order restitution,
which does not compensate the victim at all; or (2) “order restitution
117
for the full outstanding loan amount,” which will give the victim a

106. Id.
107. Id. at 32.
108. Id. “[B]oth lenders in this case, like many other foreclosing lenders, elected to waive
their rights to a deficiency judgment. This meant that the lenders accepted the collateral as full
satisfaction of their claims: they could not receive, and did not expect to receive, any further
recovery against Mr. Robers beyond the foreclosed houses.” Id. at 34.
109. Id. at 33.
110. Id. at 33–34.
111. Id. at 34.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 38.
114. Id. (citing United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 566 (8th Cir. 2012).
115. Id. at 39.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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118

windfall if he later sells the house.
B. Government’s Arguments

Addressing first the plain text meaning of the MVRA, the
government argues that when a crime covered under the MVRA
results in a victim’s loss of property, the MVRA requires the
119
defendant to return the lost property to the victim. If the return of
the lost property in full is not possible, however, the MVRA requires
the defendant to pay for the value of the lost property and allows an
offset for the value of “any part of the property” that is returned to
120
the victim. Here, the victims lost money, and no “part of the
property” that was lost was returned to them until they recouped
121
money from selling the collateral. Further, § 3663A(b)(1) addresses
the treatment of property lost by a victim, and every reference to “the
property,” including § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii)’s reference to “any part of
the property that is returned,” is a reference to the property that was
122
lost, not to any substitute or replacement property.
According to the government, Robers errs in interpreting the
statutory text, and further, the structure of the statute lends no
support to his interpretation. Read in context, the reference in §
3663A(b)(1) to property that is “returned” plainly references the
123
property that was lost because of the defendant’s criminal conduct.
Additionally, the government argues this meaning is consistent
with § 3663A(b)(1)(B)’s structure and application to instances in
which the return of the lost property is “impossible, impractical, or
124
inadequate.” Section 3663A(b)(1)(B)(i) addresses scenarios in
which none of the property can be returned, and
§
3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) addresses scenarios in which some, but not all, of
118. Id. Robers contends as well that the rule of lenity should be applied here if the Court
does not agree that the text and structure of the offset provision plainly requires offsets to
restitution for the return of collateral. Id. at 40. Robers argues that almost every defendant who
makes an in-kind return of collateral or other property would obtain a lower offset value under
the Seventh Circuit's ruling. Id at 41. Moreover, even if the returned property is converted into
cash, Robers asserts that the value would depend on conditions beyond the defendant’s control,
such as market status and the victim’s investment decisions, and the rule of lenity was designed
to avoid exactly such uncertain and unforeseeable punishments. Id.
119. See Brief for the United States at 13, Robers v. United States, No. 12-9012 (U.S. June
3, 2013).
120. Id. at 13–14.
121. Id. at 16.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Id. at 18.
124. Id. at 20–21.
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the lost property can be returned or in which the return of the
original property is inadequate to compensate the victim for some
125
reason, such as when the property is damaged. Nevertheless, the
government argues that throughout both subparagraphs, “the
126
property” referred to is always the property that was lost.
In support of its reading of the plain meaning of §
3663A(b)(1)(B), the government argues that this interpretation is
127
consistent with the overall structure of the MVRA. For example, §
3663A governs the substantive calculation of the restitution amount,
while § 3664 governs the procedures and enforcement of the
128
restitution obligation; as such, different considerations are properly
129
taken into account under each of these sections of the statute.
Although a court may order, pursuant to § 3664, that a defendant
satisfy his restitution obligation with substitute property, a court may
not grant an offset for substitute property when calculating the
130
restitution amount owed under § 3663A.
Additionally, the government asserts that its interpretation of §
3663A promotes the MVRA’s purpose of ensuring that the victim is
131
fully compensated or restored. A victim fraudulently deprived of
money, as here, is not fully compensated or restored to her original
132
state until she gets that money back. A victim of mortgage fraud has
every incentive to maximize the money she receives from foreclosed
real estate. The government notes that “[b]ecause most defendants
lack significant financial resources with which to promptly pay a
restitution award,” a victim has no assurance that she will otherwise
133
recover the money. Moreover, if the foreclosed real estate sells for
a gain, that gain will inure to the benefit of both the victim and the
134
defendant in the form of a higher offset. Under Robers’s view—that
the ultimate sales price cannot be credited against the restitution
obligation—”the victim must bear the full burden of any loss in value
135
while the defendants will enjoy the benefit of any gain.”
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
See id. at 22–23.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 37.
See id. at 28–29.
Id. at 11.
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Further, the government criticizes Robers’s argument that he did
not both directly and proximately cause the decline in the value of the
collateral real estate between the time of foreclosure and resale. The
government argues the chain of causation is clear and direct: but for
Robers’s fraud, the lenders would not have loaned him the money,
taken title to the houses upon Robers’s default, or sold the houses in a
136
declining market.
Robers’s criminal conduct directly and
proximately caused the victims’ losses and attributed to any relevance
that the declining market might have had on lowering the offset
137
calculation.
The government discounts Robers’s reliance on the principles of
mortgage and foreclosure law, asserting that the MVRA’s provisions
apply broadly and “notwithstanding any provision of mortgage law
138
that may govern the state-law rights of lenders.” Hence, because the
MVRA’s provisions do not just apply to mortgage fraud, its provisions
139
should not be “distorted” to accommodate mortgage law principles.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
The question presented to the Supreme Court is whether a
defendant, who has fraudulently obtained a loan and thus owes
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B), returns “any part” of
the loan money by giving the lenders the collateral securing the
140
loan. The answer turns on what is meant by “the property that is
returned” in the statute. Both Robers and the government claim to
rely on the plain language of the MVRA; yet, they arrive at different
conclusions as to what constitutes “the property”—conclusions that
141
yield a stark difference in the amount of restitution Robers owes.
136. Id. at 35.
137. Id. at 35–36.
138. Id. at 38–39.
139. Id. at 37–38. The government also asserts that the rule of lenity does not apply in this
case because it is a tie-breaking rule that only applies if, “at the end of the process of construing
what Congress has expressed . . . there is grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” Id. at
41. Here, the rule of lenity, argues the government, does not apply because the statutory text is
not ambiguous at all. Id.at 42.
140. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 7, at i.
141. Robers contends that the restitution award should be reduced by the houses’ higher
values in 2006 when he “surrendered” (returned) the properties to the lenders through state
foreclosure proceedings, rather than by the lower values in 2007 or 2008 when the lenders resold
the houses. Id. at 12. Robers asserts if the higher values are used and his minor role in the
offense is taken into account (in other words, the restitution obligation is apportioned), his total
restitution amount should be $4,800.00, as opposed to the $218,952.18 calculated by the
government. Id.
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The Court will likely begin its analysis by examining the relevant
statutory text of the MVRA to determine whether the meaning of the
statute is plain. Rules of statutory construction require that
consideration be given to whether a certain interpretation gives rise
142
to a consistent meaning of a phrase throughout a statute. Following
this principle, the Seventh Circuit concluded “the property” in the
143
MVRA always means the stolen property—in this case, cash. By
contrast, under Robers’s interpretation, “the property” refers to two
different things within the same section of the MVRA: the original
fraudulently-obtained loan in the first part of § 3663A(b)(1)(B); and
the returned collateral securing the loans in the latter part of that
144
section. Robers cannot have it both ways. The Court will likely agree
with the Seventh Circuit that “the property” must have a consistent
meaning within the statute, and certainly within the same section of
the statute. In this case, the Court will most likely find that the
property in § 3663A(b)(1) of the MVRA refers to the fraudulentlyobtained cash.
This result stems from the simple explanation that these two types
of property—cash and collateral—are not interchangeable. Collateral
cannot be given to the victim-lenders in lieu of cash any more than, as
the government argued, the victim of a stolen necklace can be given a
145
stamp collection in exchange for the necklace.
The Court will likely also consider the overall structure of the
MVRA in determining the meaning of the phrase “the property.”
Robers points out that pursuant to § 3664(f) of the MVRA, a court
can permit a defendant to satisfy a restitution obligation with in-kind
146
payments, including replacement property. He fails to explain,
however, that the relevant subsection of § 3664(f), allowing for the
replacement property, relates to specifying the manner and schedule
for paying the restitution order, not determining the amount of the
147
restitution obligation. In § 3663A, the section actually governing
148
determination of the restitution amount, there is no mention of
credit for in-kind payments or replacement property relative to
142. See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 942–43 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 942.
144. Id.
145. Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 15.
146. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
147. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(2), (f)(3)(A), (f)(4)(B) (West 2014); see also supra Part V.B.
148. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (West 2014); see also Brief for the United States, supra note
119, at 22.
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determining the amount of restitution. This is because Congress did
not intend to allow such payments to be included in the calculation of
defendant’s offset for purposes of reducing the restitution obligation
149
amount under § 3663A. As the government clearly states, “[s]ection
3663A ties the amount of restitution to the amount of loss a victim
suffers because of a defendant’s crime. Section 3664 dictates how a
court may ensure that a defendant actually pays the amount due
150
under Section 3663A.” Therefore, in-kind payments, including in the
form of replacement property, are reserved as a means of how the
defendant may pay the restitution obligation. The only offset given for
purposes of calculating the restitution amount is for any part of the
151
property that is returned, and here that property is cash.
The clear statutory purpose of the MVRA will guide the Court in
reaching its decision. The “primary and overarching” goal of the
MVRA is to fully compensate victims, make them whole, and return
152
them to their original status, all without providing them a windfall.
Thus, the Court will likely construe the statutory text in a way that
best serves the MVRA’s given purpose—that is, the Court will
determine whether the cash as returned property rule or the collateral
as returned property rule better serves to make the victim whole.
Inherent in making that determination, the Court will decide
which method of valuing property best serves to fully compensate the
victim and return her to her original status. Various methods of
valuing property exist, such as fair market value, assessed or appraised
value, foreclosure credit-bid value, and value at resale following
153
foreclosure (which is the cash as returned property rule). None of
these methods of appraisal, however, except the value of cash
obtained at resale after foreclosure, reflect how much the victimlender will receive in actual cash—the very thing loaned to
defendants, expected to be received from defendants, and now, as a
result of defendant’s crime, required in restitution in accordance with
the text and purpose of the MVRA.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 23.
Id. at 22.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii).
Robers, 698 F.3d at 943–44.
Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 25–26.
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The fair market value, the appraised value, and the foreclosure
154
credit-bid value cannot each serve as a determinant for the actual
eventual cash that a victim-lender might receive when the property is
later sold. The only way to know with certainty what value the
property returned will actually realize in dollars to the victim-lender
is to measure it by the eventual cash proceeds that are recouped upon
resale of the collateral property.
In a mortgage fraud case such as Robers, using the cash as
returned property rule seems to best serve the purpose of the MVRA
155
by making victims of crimes whole to the greatest extent possible. If
values are increased and the property sells for a higher amount than is
owed, the victim-lender would not be entitled to a restitution award.
If values decline, then the victim-lender would be due a restitution
award based on the difference between what was owed and what was
actually received after resale of the property. In the infrequent
scenario in which the collateral real estate has not resold before the
defendant’s sentencing (statistics indicate that in most cases the
properties sell prior to defendant’s sentencing and restitution
156
order), the sentencing court could otherwise sentence the defendant
but postpone the final determination of the victim’s losses until ninety
157
days after the sentencing. If the sale has not occurred within the
ninety days after sentencing, the Supreme Court has established
precedent for permitting the sentencing court to go beyond the
158
ninety-day timeframe to enter an order of restitution, provided the
159
sentencing court timely and explicitly reserves the right to do so.
154. Fair market value is the price a willing seller and buyer agree to in the open market.
Id.at 25. Appraised value is the value a third party assigns based on certain market variables. Id
at 26. Foreclosure credit-bid value is the value used by a lender (against the credit amount due)
that is typically just enough to win the bid and obtain title to the property at a foreclosure if
there are no other bidders or if the lender deems all other bids too low. Id.
155. See United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009).
156. Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 27–28; see also Elizabeth Renuart,
Toward a More Equitable Balance: Homeowner and Purchaser Tensions in Non-Judicial
Foreclosure States, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 562, 570 n.47 (2012) (indicating that in 2006
banks sold about 50 percent of properties bought at foreclosure within six months and close to
80 percent within a year).
157. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(d)(5) (West 2014).
158. Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 28 (citing Dolan v. United States, 560
U.S. 605, 611 (2010).
159. Dolan, 560 U.S. at 608. Interestingly, however, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, wrote a strong dissent stating that, other than the express
ninety-day exception, any order of restitution under the MVRA must be made at sentencing. Id.
at 622 (Roberts, CJ dissenting). Remaining to be seen is whether the Court in deciding Robers
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The Court will not likely be persuaded by Robers’s argument that
the Seventh Circuit’s ruling does not comport with state mortgage or
foreclosure laws since the MVRA applies much more broadly than to
just mortgage fraud. Thus, as the government suggests, the Court
should not give special meaning to § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii)’s reference to
a return of “any part of the property” in the mortgage-fraud context
because the meaning of the phrase should be consistent across the
160
MVRA’s applications.
Neither mortgage nor foreclosure laws
address the meaning of the phrase, “any part of the property” in §
3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii), further evidence that the MVRA’s provisions are
161
not particular to mortgage or foreclosure laws.
Therefore, the
district court properly calculated Robers’s restitution amount
irrespective of any state mortgage law or foreclosure practice that
may govern lenders’ rights.
Likewise, the Court will probably reject Robers’s argument that
he did not proximately and directly cause all his victims’ losses.
Proximate cause principles should have no impact on the offset
calculation in § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii). The government convincingly
argues Robers’s fraudulent conduct indisputably initiated the chain of
events that directly and proximately caused the victim-lenders to lose
162
the original loan amounts he borrowed from them. And these are
the losses for which Robers should provide restitution. Principles of
causation do not factor into the determination of when “any part of
163
the property” that was lost is returned to a victim.
164
This conclusion is supported by United States v. Paul. There, the
Second Circuit held in a securities fraud case that a decline in the
value of collateral stock due to market forces was irrelevant to the
restitution offset calculation since the stock was only collateral for the
165
fraudulently-obtained loans. The court concluded that “[t]he loss to
the brokerage houses resulted from [defendant’s] inducement of the
loans, and it is for this loss that [defendant] must provide
sees this issue as a loose end that needs to be re-visited, and, if so, how it will attempt to tie up
such loose end.
160. Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 38.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 34.
163. Id.
164. 634 F.3d 668 cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 538 (2011).
165. Id. at 678.
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166

restitution.”
Additionally, Robers’s argument that the victims’ retention of the
collateral after foreclosure resulted in an intervening event that broke
the causal chain will likely not hold up. There appears to be no
support in the record indicating that the lenders could have resold the
167
properties as soon as they acquired them after foreclosure.
Additionally, commonplace knowledge about the mortgage industry
dispels the notion that lenders can resell foreclosed properties
168
promptly after foreclosure. Moreover, as explained by the Seventh
Circuit, “[t]he decline in the real estate market does not mitigate
[Robers’s] fraud . . . . Absent Robers’s fraud, the decline in the real
estate market would have been irrelevant . . . . The declining market
169
only became an issue because of Robers’s fraud.”
Finally, Robers should not receive credit against his restitution
award on the grounds that the decline in the housing market was
unforeseeable. government“A defendant who fraudulently obtains
loan proceeds and then depends on the foreclosure of the collateral to
partially compensate his victims for their loss predictably (and by his
own volition) ties the amount of restitution he will have to pay to the
170
health of the housing market.” Therefore, that the housing market
might decline should have been a distinct, foreseeable possibility.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the statutory text, structure, and strong purpose of the
MVRA will likely create a sufficient basis for the Supreme Court to
uphold the Seventh Circuit’s ruling. The Court will likely determine
that the property (or any part of it) returned, giving rise to an offset
under § 3663A(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the MVRA, refers to the fraudulentlyobtained property—in this case, the cash. Valuing the property
returned based on the eventual cash proceeds received at resale after
foreclosure provides the most certainty for making the victim-lenders
whole and thus fulfilling the purpose of the MVRA.
The Court will likely endorse the cash as returned property rule;

166. Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 34 (quoting Paul, 634 U.S. at 678).
167. See Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 36.
168. Id. (citations omitted) (“A bank with [real-estate-owned] inventory is faced with
property it does not want to own, possible title, repair, lien, and tax issues that it must clear
before it can sell, mounting maintenance costs, and other headaches.”).
169. United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 943–44 (7th Cir. 2012).
170. Brief for the United States, supra note 119, at 35–36.
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however, it may also determine the need to re-address what happens
if the property does not sell within ninety days after sentencing—the
amount of time expressly granted to a sentencing court under the
MVRA to delay the final determination of the victim’s losses and
171
enter a restitution order.

171. See supra note 152.

